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I. Introduction 
 
In the past weeks, as the U.S. economy has teetered on the edge of the worst financial 
panic since the 1930s, the specter of economic Depression has been raised by many 
observers. For black Milwaukeeans, however, a “stealth depression” in the region’s labor 
market has been underway for decades.1 
In a series of studies over the past five years, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
Center for Economic Development has documented the alarming extent to which 
joblessness among working-age African American males has grown in Milwaukee since 
the 1970s.2 Once one of the nation’s most opportunity-filled urban labor markets for 
black males, by 2000 Milwaukee registered among the highest rates of black male 
joblessness and largest racial disparities in jobless rates among U.S. cities and 
metropolitan areas. In our in-depth study, The Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in 
Milwaukee, we analyzed the reasons for the sharp racial disparities in the Milwaukee 
labor market, examined the shortcomings of existing policies, and recommended a 
sweeping set of new strategies to meet the challenge – nothing short of a Milwaukee 
“Marshall Plan” to attack the city’s job crisis.3 
This research update, based on newly released data from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census’ American Community Survey, reveals that the crisis of black male joblessness is 
once again intensifying in Milwaukee. In 2007, the most recent year for which data is 
available, a staggering 51.1 percent of metro Milwaukee’s working-age African 
American males were out-of-work: either unemployed, or, for various reasons (including 
incarceration), not in the labor force. This is the highest jobless rate among working age 
                                                
1 We first called attention to this “stealth depression” in a 2003 report: Marc V. Levine, Stealth 
Depression: Joblessness in the City of Milwaukee Since 1990 (UWM Center for Economic Development, 
August 2003). 
2 See Marc V. Levine, The Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee: Trends, Explanations, and 
Policy Options (UWM Center for Economic Development, March 2007); and Marc V. Levine, The Crisis 
of Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee: 2006 (UWM Center for Economic Development, October 2007). 
3 See Levine, The Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee: Trends, Explanations, and Policy 
Options, pp. 56-63. 
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black males ever recorded in Milwaukee4, and a substantial increase from 2006, when the 
rate was an already unacceptable 46.8 percent.  
Moreover, although the rate of black male joblessness remains shockingly high in 
urban centers across the country, metro Milwaukee holds the dubious distinction in 2007 
of recording the second-highest rate of joblessness for working-age black males, and the 
widest racial disparity in jobless rates among a sample of the nation’s largest 
metropolitan areas. In short, the crisis continues, the current mix of policies and strategies 
remains ineffective, and the need for dramatic new directions in policy remains. 
 
II. Measuring Joblessness 
 
The level of joblessness in a labor market is most often conveyed in one universally 
recognized and widely reported number: the unemployment rate. This statistic measures 
the percentage of people over the age of 16 in an area’s civilian labor force, actively 
looking for work, who do not have a job.  
However, the official unemployment rate is an imperfect and sometimes misleading 
indicator of the true extent of joblessness. As calculated by the federal Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), the officially unemployed do not include working-age people who are 
not working but, for various reasons, are not in the labor force.  Some of these potential 
workers, such as most students and homemakers, as well as the voluntarily self-employed 
or voluntarily retired, have chosen not to be in the labor force; thus, it makes sense to 
exclude them from measures of unemployment. Some suffer from employment 
disabilities that preclude them from labor force participation and hence are not counted in 
the official unemployment rate. 
Many other potential workers, however, are not included in the official 
unemployment rate even though they are not necessarily among the voluntarily jobless.  
Some are “discouraged workers,” who have given up looking for elusive employment. 
                                                
4 Using a different data set, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, we reported a black male jobless rate in 
2002 in the city of Milwaukee of 58.8 percent [See Marc V. Levine, After the Boom: Joblessness in 
Milwaukee Since 2000 (UWM Center for Economic Development, 2004, p. 14)]. However, the BLS 
statistics included all males over the age of 16, including those over 65 who were out of the labor force. 
The data here include only working-age males, ages 16-64, and therefore more accurately measure 
joblessness.  
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Others may simply not enter the labor market, convinced that appropriate jobs are not 
available. These individuals do not show up in the official unemployment statistics, 
although they are clearly part of the jobless population in a community. Moreover, some 
economists believe that the employment disability system may also be camouflaging the 
true rate of joblessness in many communities. 5 
Thus, because the official unemployment rate ignores those who are not seeking jobs, 
it understates the full scope of joblessness. A different way, therefore, to gauge 
joblessness –and the one we will use in this report—is to look at the percentage of the 
total working age not employed: everyone between the ages of 16-64, not just those 
actively in the civilian labor force. Obviously, this “jobless rate” will never be zero: aside 
from “frictional unemployment” (people between jobs), there are always working-age 
full-time students, homemakers, early retirees, or the self-employed who are voluntarily 
not in the labor force. But clearly, the more robust the labor market, the lower the jobless 
rate for the entire working-age population. Typically, in a labor market near full-
employment, the jobless rate for the full working-age male population (ages 16-64) will 
hover in the 18-20 percent range; for the prime working-age male population (ages 25-
54), the “full employment” jobless rate will be in the 8-10 percent range. 
 
III. Race and Male Joblessness in Milwaukee: 2007 
 
As Table 1 reveals, the jobless rate for working-age African American males in the 
four-county metropolitan Milwaukee region stood at 51.1 percent in 2007, a substantial 
increase from 46.8 percent in 2006. At 51.1 percent, the black male joblessness rate is 
now at the highest level in Milwaukee ever recorded in official statistics. The black male 
jobless rate in Milwaukee is now double what it was in 1970, and up over 35 percent 
from as recently as 1990. 
By contrast, the jobless rates for both white and Hispanic males remained unchanged 
between 2006-2007.  As a result, the region’s racial disparity in joblessness remains 
imposing: in 2007, the jobless rate for black males was almost three times the white rate 
                                                
5 See appendix to this report for a brief discussion of the complicated connections between employment 
disabilities, official unemployment rates, and accurate measures of joblessness. 
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and is now more than double the Hispanic rate. Milwaukee’s racial gap in joblessness, as 
Table 6 below shows, remains the widest among large, racially diverse U.S. metropolitan 
areas.  
Table 1: 
Male Joblessness in Metropolitan Milwaukee, 2000-2006 
 (percentage of working-age* males unemployed or not in the labor force) 
 
YEAR BLACK WHITE HISPANIC 
2000 47.6% 16.0% 34.1% 
2006 46.8% 17.9% 22.7% 
2007 51.1% 18.6% 22.9% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 2000; American  
Community Survey, 2006, 2007 
*Working-age = between ages of 16-64 
 
Tables 2-4 provide more detail on male joblessness in metro Milwaukee in 2007, 
breaking down jobless rates by race, age, and place of residence. Three observations 
stand out. First, jobless rates are high in all age categories for black males in metro 
Milwaukee. Even in the prime working-age category --between the ages of 25-54, when 
issues of retirement or schooling are not significant factors removing potential workers 
from the labor market—43.2 percent of Milwaukee’s black males are either unemployed 
or not in the labor market. Once again, this represents a substantial, 30 percent increase 
over 2006, when the jobless rate for African American males in their prime working 
years was 33.1 percent. And it is a huge jump from the Milwaukee of 1970, when the rate 
was merely 15.2 percent. In short, the jobless rate for black males in their prime working 
years in Milwaukee has almost tripled in a generation. This massive growth in 
joblessness has occurred even though the percentage of Milwaukee African Americans 
over 25 with a high school diploma increased from 34.0 to 76.1 percent between 1970-
2007, while the percentage holding college degrees jumped from 3.8 percent to 10.5 
percent during that same period. These statistics suggest that the view of education as a 
panacea to the crisis of black male joblessness is, at a minimum, simplistic.6 
                                                
6 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population and Housing: Milwaukee, Wis. Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2007, Table 
B15002B (accessed at www.census.gov, American Factfinder). The data for 1970 include both sexes; the 
2007 rates are for males only. 
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Table 2: 
Metropolitan Milwaukee Male Jobless Rates: 2007 
By Race, Ethnicity, and Age 
 
 
AGE CATEGORY BLACK WHITE HISPANIC 
16-24 64.5% 37.8% 44.4% 
25-54 43.2% 10.4% 15.7% 
55-64 61.8% 28.4% 25.6% 
Source: American Community Survey, 2007. 
 
Second key observation: a huge racial gap in male joblessness exists in all age 
categories in metro Milwaukee. As Table 2 shows, black male joblessness in the key 25-
54 year old age group was four times the white rate in 2007, the widest racial disparity in 
joblessness Milwaukee since large-scale black migration to the city began in the 1960s.  
Moreover, the jobless rate in 2007 among prime working-age black males was also 
significantly higher than the rate for Hispanic males in metro Milwaukee – almost three 
times as high (43.2 percent to 15.7 percent). As we first noted in the Crisis of Black Male 
Joblessness in Milwaukee, since the early 1990s Hispanic males have increasingly gained 
a foothold in jobs requiring low to moderate skills in the Milwaukee area labor market. In 
2007, for example, although African Americans outnumbered Hispanics by 64 percent 
among working age males in Greater Milwaukee, there were 56 percent more Hispanic 
males than black males employed in construction and 59 percent more Hispanic males 
than black males in production jobs in the region. As Table 4 shows, although Hispanics 
represented 8.5 percent of all employed males in metro Milwaukee, they represented 11.3 
percent of construction and repair workers (compared to blacks, who represented 7.3 
percent), and 17 percent of production workers (compared to blacks, who constituted 
10.7 percent). The reasons for these disparities are unclear and would certainly warrant 
additional research. 
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Table 3: 
Employment By Race and Ethnicity in 
The Metropolitan Milwaukee Male Labor Market: 2007 
 
Total Employment in Selected Occupations, by Race and Ethnicity 
 
OCCUPATION BLACK WHITE HISPANIC 
Total: Working-Age Males 69,476 370,567 42,677 
Total: Employed Males 34,981 313,779 33,641 
Managerial and Professional 8,022 119,076 3,310 
Construction/Repair 3,719 40,288 5,807 
Production 5,332 34,318 8,478 
Transportation/Material Moving 5,479 24,096 5,574 
Source: Same as Table 2 
 
 
Table 4: 
Ethnic and Racial Disparities in  
The Metropolitan Milwaukee Male Labor Market: 2007 
 
% of employment in selected occupations, by race and ethnicity 
 
OCCUPATION BLACK WHITE HISPANIC OTHERS 
Total: Working-Age Males 13.8% 73.6% 8.5% 4.1% 
Total: Employed Males 8.8% 79.1% 8.5% 3.6% 
Managerial and Professional 5.8% 86.8% 2.4% 5.4% 
Construction/Repair 7.3% 78.7% 11.3% 2.7% 
Production 10.7% 68.8% 17.0% 3.5% 
Transportation/Material Moving 15.1% 66.4% 15.4% 3.1% 
Source: Same as Table 2 
 
Finally, as Table 5 shows, for both black and white males in metro Milwaukee, there 
is a substantial disparity in the jobless rates posted in the city of Milwaukee as opposed to 
the suburbs. Among prime working-age white males (ages 25-54), for example, the 
jobless rate in the city is almost double the rate in the suburbs. However, since the vast 
majority (78 percent) of working-age white males in the region live in the suburbs, the 
impact of this city-suburban disparity on overall rates of metropolitan area white male 
joblessness is mitigated. On the other hand, this city-suburban disparity overlaps with the 
racial segregation of metro Milwaukee’s labor market: almost 90 percent of the region’s 
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black male workers live in the city of Milwaukee where, as we have documented in 
earlier reports, there has been no net job growth since the late 1970s. Consequently, as 
Table 5 clearly shows, in 2007 there was a sharp racial polarization of the region’s male 
labor market, with the largest gaps in jobless rates separating white suburbanites from 
black residents of the central city. For example, among prime working-age males (ages 
25-54), the jobless rate for black males living in the city of Milwaukee (43.8 percent) was 
five times the rate white suburbanites (8.4 percent) in 2007.  Indeed, in a stunning 
indicator of racial polarization in the Greater Milwaukee labor market: the jobless rate for 
white young adults (ages 16-24) living in the Milwaukee suburbs was lower in 2007 than 
the jobless rate for prime working-age (25-54) African American males.  
 
 
Table 5: 
City-Suburban Disparities in Male Joblessness in Metropolitan Milwaukee: 2007 
 
Jobless Rates (%), by Race, Ethnicity, Age, and Place of Residence 
 
AGE BLACK 
CITY  
BLACK 
SUBURBS 
WHITE 
CITY 
WHITE 
SUBURBS 
HISPANIC 
CITY 
HISPANIC 
SUBURBS 
All Working Age 51.7% 46.8% 25.0% 16.7% 23.9% 20.0% 
 
Young Adults 65.5% 58.6% 44.6% 35.6% 45.9% 39.5% 
 
Prime Working 
Age 
43.8% 38.5% 16.5% 8.6% 16.5% 12.9% 
Source: Same as Table 2. All working age= 16-64; Young adults = 16-24; Prime working age = 25-54 
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IV. Race and Joblessness in Milwaukee: A Comparative 
Perspective, 2007  
 
 
The crisis of black male joblessness pervades urban America. But, among the largest 
metropolitan areas in the Northeast and Midwest, the employment situation for black 
males in Milwaukee remains near the bleakest. As the chart below shows, in 2007 
Milwaukee posted the second highest rate of black male joblessness among a sample of 
35 benchmark metropolises from across the country. These large metropolises represent a 
broad variety of regions and overall economic conditions, and each has a significant 
African American population.  
Not only did Milwaukee register the second worst rate of black male joblessness 
among the country’s large metropolitan areas in 2007, but the racial gap here in male 
joblessness was, by far, the widest.  While Milwaukee posted the second highest level of 
black male joblessness among large U.S. metro areas, it recorded the third lowest rate of 
white male joblessness in 2007 in these metropolises (see Table 6 below). Remarkably, 
the rate of white male joblessness in metro Milwaukee was lower even than in booming 
Sunbelt metropolises such as Phoenix, Las Vegas, Atlanta, and Houston, and lower than 
in high tech and “creative class” meccas such as Seattle, Boston, or San Francisco. 
Thus, in 2007, the black male jobless rate in Milwaukee was a staggering 32.5 
percentage points higher than the white rate, by far the biggest racial gap among the 35 
large metropolises analyzed here. Only in depressed, deindustrializing Buffalo did the 
racial gap in joblessness come close (at 26.1 percentage points) to Milwaukee’s.  In metro 
Milwaukee, the black jobless rate was 2.7 times higher than white rate, far and away the 
largest racial disparity of any benchmark large metropolis. Indeed, to put this massive 
gap in perspective: in only 9 of the 35 metropolitan areas examined was the black jobless 
rate even double the white rate; in Milwaukee, by contrast, the black rate was nearly 
triple the white rate.  
 10 
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Table 6: 
Male Jobless Rates in Selected Metropolitan Areas, By Race: 2007 
Percentage of working-age (16-64) males either 
unemployed or out of the labor force 
 
METRO AREA BLACK  
JOBLESS % 
WHITE  
JOBLESS % 
BLACK/  
WHITE  
RATIO 
 
 
PCT. GAP IN 
BLACK/ 
WHITE 
RATES 
Milwaukee 51.1 18.6 2.74 32.5 
Buffalo 51.4 25.3 2.03 26.1 
Detroit 50.6 25.6 1.97 25.0 
St. Louis 46.3 21.4 2.16 24.9 
Chicago 45.1 20.4 2.21 24.7 
Kansas City 43.2 18.9 2.28 24.3 
San Francisco 44.4 20.8 2.13 23.6 
Cincinnati 44.6 22.2 2.01 22.4 
Minneapolis 39.6 18.0 2.21 21.6 
Memphis 40.3 18.9 2.13 21.4 
Cleveland 42.4 22.3 1.90 20.1 
Birmingham 41.2 22.1 1.86 19.1 
Pittsburgh 42.9 23.8 1.80 19.1 
Philadelphia 40.6 21.7 1.87 18.9 
Baltimore 39.1 21.4 1.82 17.7 
Indianapolis 37.7 20.3 1.85 17.4 
Hartford 36.1 19.5 1.85 16.6 
Houston 36.5 20.1 1.8 16.4 
Phoenix 37.7 21.9 1.72 15.8 
Dallas 35.3 19.5 1.81 15.8 
Columbus 37.7 22.6 1.66 15.1 
Richmond 37.2 22.1 1.68 15.1 
Los Angeles 38.2 23.2 1.64 15.0 
New York 36.7 22.1 1.66 14.6 
Jacksonville 38.7 24.5 1.57 14.2 
Charlotte 32.1 17.9 1.79 14.2 
Las Vegas 35.3 21.3 1.61 14.0 
Nashville 34.2 20.4 1.67 13.8 
Atlanta 33.1 20.0 1.65 13.1 
Seattle 34.6 21.6 1.60 13.0 
Boston 34.1 21.7 1.57 12.4 
Miami 34.4 23.4 1.47 11.0 
Washington 29.5 19.0 1.55 10.5 
Denver 28.7 18.7 1.53 10.0 
San Diego 31.1 21.6 1.43 9.5 
 
Source: See Table 2 
 12 
 
V. Race and Joblessness in Milwaukee: Policy Implications 
 
The startling surge in the level of black male joblessness in Milwaukee reported 
here comes at an anxious time in the city and the nation’s economic history. Consider this 
ominous fact: between 2006-07, as black male joblessness climbed here by over nine 
percent, total employment in the city of Milwaukee –where the overwhelming majority of 
the region’s black workers live—actually increased by 549. Now fast forward to 2008: 
since mid-2007, Milwaukee has lost employment for twelve consecutive months, 
between July 2007 and July 2008, shedding almost 2,800 employed residents in the 
process.7 With a national economy poised on the edge of a major recession –or worse—
and on top of an already deteriorating labor market in Milwaukee, the city faces the grave 
prospect of further increases in black male joblessness. 
 The persistent level of black male joblessness and chasm-like racial disparities in 
employment in Milwaukee are an outrage, a civic embarrassment, and a stain on the 
community. The failure of local political and corporate leadership to meaningfully 
combat this calamity threatens the economic fabric of the city and the region.   
In The Crisis of Black Male Joblessness, we analyzed the shortcomings in 
Milwaukee’s current portfolio of strategies to combat black male joblessness, and 
outlined new directions for public policy. With the surging rate of joblessness registered 
in 2007 as a backdrop, we offer below the highlights of the original analysis (with a few 
new wrinkles). 
 
Local Policy and the Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee 
 
 Milwaukee’s civic leadership appears to have settled into a three-pronged "jobs 
strategy" to combat predominantly minority inner city joblessness: workforce 
development, minority entrepreneurship, and regionalism. All are worthy policy 
objectives and, in principle, can contribute to improving the local labor market. All, 
however, are deeply flawed as cornerstones of a local jobs strategy; in particular, without 
                                                
7 See UW-Milwaukee Center for Economic Development, Monthly Employment Watch: Milwaukee and 
the Nation’s Largest Cities (September 2008). 
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other more direct job creation policies ("demand-side"), these ('supply side") approaches 
are unlikely to have a significant impact on the crisis of black male joblessness in 
Milwaukee. Milwaukee's recent history, as is the case nationwide, is littered with 
disappointing results from job training programs. Workforce development is predicated 
on the fallacious assumptions that enough jobs exist for properly trained workers, or that 
with adequate training enough private-sector jobs will be created for all workers. In fact, 
in 2005, by conservative estimate, there were 88,294 more jobless than available jobs in 
metro Milwaukee; there were six jobless Milwaukeeans for every available job in 2005; 
there were an astounding nine jobless for every available full-time job. Given the 
contraction of the labor market over the past twelve months, and the prospect of a deep 
recession on horizon, it seems likely that this “job gap” has grown since 2005 and will 
continue to grow in the near-term. The primary need in Milwaukee is not improved job 
training but rather policies that increase the demand for low- to moderate-skilled labor 
and attack the critical shortage of available jobs in the region. 
Minority entrepreneurship also offers little prospect of improving the employment 
picture for working-age black males. In the 50 largest metro areas in the country, there is 
no evidence that high rates of black business ownership produce low rates of black 
joblessness. Black-owned businesses employ a tiny fraction of workers (less than one 
percent in Milwaukee), so even huge growth in black-owned businesses would have a 
trivial impact on the black jobless rate. Again, as in the case of job training, minority 
entrepreneurship surely has a role in Milwaukee’s policy mix, for a host of social justice 
and economic development reasons. But, it is not a viable cornerstone for the kind of 
anti-joblessness policy necessary in this community.  
 Finally, Milwaukee 7 (M-7) "regionalism" could contribute significantly to 
alleviating the crisis of black male joblessness. But, so far, the M-7 seems focused on 
micro-fixes and gimmicks, such as: a) “better” branding and marketing Milwaukee; b) 
pursuing what one researcher has dubbed the "job training charade" as a response to 
mythical labor shortages; and c) focusing on under-researched, under-debated, and much-
hyped gimmicks such as turning Milwaukee into the “Silicon Valley of water 
technology.” There has been no real attention by the M-7 to the kinds of regional "equity" 
polices in transportation, public finance and housing that could make a difference in 
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combating minority joblessness. 
New Directions to Combat Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee 
 
We have identified four strategies that offer far greater likelihood of reducing 
black male joblessness in Milwaukee than the approaches above: 
  
Public infrastructure investment, which will not only meet pressing needs in a 
community with aging infrastructure, but could also play a critical role in boosting, 
Keynesian-style, local demand for low- to moderate-skilled labor. Particularly if 
accompanied by explicit minority-hiring goals or low-income resident preferential hiring 
programs, public investments could be a central element in a real Milwaukee "jobs 
strategy." The examples of the Marquette Interchange project and the city of Milwaukee's 
"Residents Preference Program" (RPP) show the promise of this "demand-side" approach 
to the labor market. 
 In particular, we recommend that Milwaukee leaders vigorously pursue 
development of a jobs-producing, competitiveness-enhancing regional light rail transit 
system. In its political resistance to light rail, Milwaukee is increasingly isolated among 
U.S. cities.  
The more Milwaukee remains immobilized on this issue, especially in an era of 
skyrocketing gas prices, the more the region risks falling further behind our competitors 
economically, and the more we lose the opportunity for a "big bang" investment that 
could ameliorate the labor market for low- to moderate-skilled workers. Moreover, in a 
segregated Milwaukee that suffers from the nation’s most entrenched spatial and racial 
labor market mismatch, rail can better knit together the region’s employment hubs and 
residential neighborhoods, in particular making jobs more accessible to a public transit- 
dependent central city working-age population. 
 Mayor Barrett has taken some welcome steps in promoting rail transit in 
Milwaukee, although his proposed “starter” system – a downtown “Circulator”—would 
do little to either stimulate local economic growth, create many jobs, link workers to 
employment centers, or generate support for the necessary larger rail network. Indeed, 
it’s likely that the mayor’s trolley to nowhere would draw meager ridership, thus 
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providing ammunition to the opponents of light rail, foreclosing future investments and 
leaving us with an underutilized white elephant ringing downtown. A bolder vision is 
necessary. 
Properly concerned about fiscal responsibility, Mr. Barrett says that “advocates 
have failed to explain how to fund a more extensive system.” Yes, public finances are 
tight here, but this is hardly a fiscal state of affairs unique to Milwaukee. Somehow, 
though, leaders in places as varied as Denver, Baltimore, Dallas, Minneapolis, Charlotte, 
Salt Lake City, Portland, and St. Louis have financed the construction or expansion of 
their systems in recent years. Moreover, even in fiscally strapped Milwaukee, we’ve 
found a way to spend billions in the past decade on a baseball stadium and a convention 
center, mega-projects that nearly all economists agree contribute precious little to 
regional economic growth.  
Given the economic development importance of transit investment for 
Milwaukee, a financially sensible rail plan must be crafted, linking key employment hubs 
and neighborhoods. Even in that bastion of big government liberalism –Dallas, Texas—
voters have approved bond issues to pay for such an investment. In Milwaukee, a plan 
could be funded by existing federal dollars; extensive use of existing rail rights of way; 
creative deployment of tools such as tax incremental financing and the sale of station-
area development rights; and, yes, a regional sales tax (with rebates or exemptions to 
low-income residents). 
In the last analysis, the biggest obstacle to getting this done is political, not fiscal. 
The mayor needs to advocate a more extensive rail plan, one that provides travel speed 
and network scope. The region’s corporate leaders, represented by the Metropolitan 
Milwaukee Association of Commerce (MMAC) and the Greater Milwaukee Committee 
(GMAC), supposedly support regional rail transit. If that’s true, they should get behind 
the mayor, and firmly denounce the obstructionism and intransigence of political leaders 
they support, like County Executive Scott Walker, who are the primary causes of political 
gridlock over transit. The MMAC and GMC should support a comprehensive regional 
light rail plan, including adequate financing, and make it the centerpiece of the 
Milwaukee 7 initiative that could underpin an economic revitalization of the city and 
region. 
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National policy should also help fiscally constrained cities like Milwaukee make 
these kinds of jobs-producing investments. Democratic presidential candidate Barack 
Obama includes in his economic platform a proposal for a $60 billion “National 
Infrastructure Reinvestment Bank” that could provide an infusion of funds to cities such 
as Milwaukee to invest in transit as well as in other infrastructure vital to economic 
development. Some analysts, such as legendary investment banker Felix Rohatyn, 
suggest that such a commitment could leverage perhaps $250 billion for infrastructure 
around the country. That would make a huge impact in jump-starting stagnant urban 
economies such as Milwaukee’s. 
 Green Jobs. A coalition of organizations, including a “blue-green alliance” of the 
Sierra Club and the United Steel Workers, recently released a report showing how a 
“green economic investment of $100 billion” nationally in energy efficiency and renewal 
energy could create 2 million new “blue/green collar” jobs across the country. These 
investments would be in retrofitting buildings; mass transit and freight rail; smart grid 
electrical transmission systems; wind energy; solar energy; and advanced biofuels. Such 
investments are, of course, vital to national priorities of energy independence and fighting 
global warming. But they will also stimulate economic development and job growth, 
particularly in jobs accessible to low and moderate-skilled workers – the crux of the crisis 
of black male joblessness. For example: “Constructing wind farms creates jobs for sheet 
metal workers, machinists, and truck drivers, among many others. Increasing the energy 
efficiency of buildings through retrofitting requires roofers, insulators, and building 
inspectors. Expanding mass transit systems employs civil engineers, electricians, and 
dispatchers.”8 
“This green recovery program,” the report continues, “will provide a major boost 
to the construction and manufacturing sectors throughout the United States through much 
needed spending on green infrastructure.” Indeed, according to the researchers’ 
projections, the “green recovery” program could create 18,988 jobs in the M-7 counties, 
including 11,397 in Milwaukee County alone – the epicenter of black male joblessness in 
                                                
8 Robert Pollin, Heidi Garrett-Peltier, James Heintz, and Helen Scharber, Green Recovery Program: 
Impact Wisconsin (Center for American Progress and Political Economy Research Institute, September 
2009), p. 3. Accessed at www.peri.umass.edu/green_recovery 
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Wisconsin.9 This is a much more promising job-creation strategy than the current array of 
M-7 schemes such as the failed “Initiative for Competitive Milwaukee,” or hyped-up 
plans to turn Milwaukee into the “Silicon Valley of water technology.”   
Fortunately, Milwaukee does have some embryonic plans that put us potentially at 
the forefront of green jobs development. The UW-Madison Center on Wisconsin 
Strategy, working with Mayor Barrett and the City of Milwaukee, has designed an 
innovative Milwaukee energy efficiency initiative: the Me2. This project, focusing on 
building retrofitting, offers a promising beginning to blue-green economic development 
in Milwaukee, and could provide thousands of job opportunities for inner city workers.10 
It should be fast-tracked and fully funded, and it could pave the way to the more 
comprehensive green development strategies sketched above.  
 Community Benefits Agreements. The RPP and Marquette Interchange projects 
show that targeted hiring standards attached to local investments can improve the 
employment prospects for minorities and the disadvantaged. Milwaukee should follow 
the example of a growing number of cities around the country and attach "community 
benefits agreements" (CBAs) to major redevelopment projects, to give preferential hiring 
to inner city residents and minorities, and to require developers receiving public subsidies 
to meet job creation and wage standards. Moreover, all developers doing business in 
Milwaukee should be encouraged to meet these standards. The “Park East 
Redevelopment Compact” (PERC) and the recently proposed “Milwaukee Opportunities 
for Restoring Employment” (MORE) ordinance offer excellent examples of how 
community benefits agreements tied to economic development projects could ensure that 
Milwaukee’s jobless get first crack at the jobs created by public subsidies and 
investments. 
 Muscular Regionalism. A critical element of a jobs strategy in Milwaukee must 
involve regional equity and “smart growth” policies in transportation, public finance, and 
land use that go far beyond the timid regionalism of the M-7. In addition, we need to do a 
much better job of opening up the suburban labor markets of the region to racial 
diversity. "Opening up the suburbs" might include several policy options, but the two 
                                                
9 Sierra Club and United Steelworkers, Wisconsin’s Road to Energy Independence. Accessed at 
www.sierraclub.org/energy/bluegreenjobs 
10 For a description of the Me2 project, see: http://www.cows.org/collab_projects_detail.asp?id=54 
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most important are transportation and housing. Regional transportation policies must be 
realigned to facilitate the access of central city workers to suburban employment centers; 
and building affordable housing in the suburbs is essential, so that low-to-moderate-
skilled workers, with limited incomes, can live in greater proximity to the location of 90 
percent of the region's entry-level job openings. 
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Technical Appendix: Employment Disabilities, Unemployment, 
and Joblessness 
 
 We have argued in this report that the official unemployment rate is a flawed 
statistic for measuring the true extent of joblessness in a community, primarily because 
the official rate leaves out portions of the working-age population who, for a variety of 
reasons, are not in the labor force. This is why, for example, many economists look to the 
“employment-population” ratio –essentially the flip-side equivalent of our “jobless” 
statistic—as a better measure of joblessness than the unemployment rate. 
 The official unemployment rate for black males in metro Milwaukee in 2007 was 
21.7 percent – awful enough, but lower than the 51.1 percent jobless rate that headlines 
this report. A legitimate question: does the joblessness statistic overstate the number of 
able-bodied jobless, by including those with employment disabilities who are not counted 
in the official unemployment statistics because they are not actively seeking work? For 
example, if we subtract all “not employed” working-age black males reporting any 
disability (not necessarily a technically defined “employment disability”), the jobless rate 
reported in this study would drop to 33.8 percent. 
 The problem is that “employment disability” has become something of a 
controversial topic among labor economists. For example, Austan Goolsbee, an 
economist at the University of Chicago (and currently Democratic presidential nominee 
Barack Obama’s chief economic adviser) argues that the official unemployment rate has 
been kept artificially low “only because government programs, especially Social Security 
disability, have effectively been buying people off the unemployment rolls and 
reclassifying them as ‘not in the labor force.’ In other words, the government has cooked 
the books.” He calls it “a kind of invisible unemployment” – moving, in record numbers,  
“people who would normally be counted as unemployed…[with] hard-to-verify 
disabilities like back pain and mental disorders, into the disability system.”11 
 Importantly, Goolsbee concludes: “The point is not whether every person on 
disability deserves payments. The point is that in previous recessions these people would 
have been called unemployed. They would have filed for unemployment insurance. They 
                                                
11 Austan Goolsbee, “The Index of Missing Economic Indicators: The Unemployment Myth,” The New 
York Times, November 30, 2003. 
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would have shown up in the statistics. They would have helped create a more accurate 
picture of national unemployment, a crucial barometer we use to measure the 
performance of the economy, the likelihood of inflation and the state of the job market.” 
(my emphasis). 
 Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the extent to which this explosion in disabilities may 
have distorted the official unemployment rate in Milwaukee. Between 2000 and 2007, 
among working-age males of all racial and ethnic groups, the number reporting 
employment disabilities shot up by 63.8 percent, and the number reporting “any disability 
and not employed” increased by 23.9 percent – yet, the total number of working-age 
males in metro Milwaukee grew by just 6.3 percent during this period. Table 8 breaks 
down the disability numbers by race, and shows that the number of black males with “any 
disability, not employed” almost doubled between 2000-2007. Again, following 
Goolsbee, the issue is not whether these disabilities “deserve payments;” it is that, 
historically, these individuals would have been included in the unemployment statistics. 
They are included in the jobless statistics presented in this report. 
 
 
Table 7 
Rising Disability Among Working-Age Males  
In Metropolitan Milwaukee: 2000-2007 
 
CATEGORY 2000 2007 % 
CHANGE 
 
With employment disability, not 
employed 
16,071 26,320 +63.8% 
With any disability, not employed 28,480 35,285 +23.9% 
Total # working-age males in 
population 
465,301 496,830 +6.3% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 2000; American  
Community Survey, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 21 
Table 8 
 
Disability Among Working-Age Males  
In Metropolitan Milwaukee, by Race and Ethnicity: 2000-2007 
 
  
RACIAL/ETHNIC 
GROUP 
2000 2007 % 
CHANGE 
Black 6,547 12,168 +85.9% 
White 14,857 19,807 +33.3% 
Hispanic 3,560 2,176 -38.9% 
  Source: Same as Table 7 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
